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HERALD OF AEGYPTUS 
    The prey is mine, unless force rend it from me. […] 
THE KING OF ARGOS 
    Know that if words unstained by violence 
    Can change these maidens' choice, then mayest thou, 
    With full consent of theirs, conduct them hence. 
    But thus the city with one voice ordained- 
    No force shall bear away the maiden band. 
    Firmly this word upon the temple wall 
    Is by a rivet clenched, and shall abide: 
    Not upon wax inscribed and delible, 
    Nor upon parchment sealed and stored away.- 
    Lo, thou hast heard our free mouths speak their will: 
    Out from our presence-tarry not, but go! […] 
DANAUS 
    Ye, to the many words of wariness 
    Spoken by me your father, add this word, 
    That, tried by time, our unknown company 
    Be held for honest: over-swift are tongues 
    To slander strangers, over-light is speech 
    To bring pollution on a stranger's name. 
Aeschylus (VI B.C.), The Suppliants 
 
"From the strain  
of binding opposites 
comes harmony" 
Heraclius (V B.C.), Fragments 
 
"From wherever the glance looks up at  the sky,  
the distance between human and divine is always the 
same […]  
the most beautiful things shall follow us everywhere:  
universal nature and one's own virtue" 
Seneca (V A.C.), Consolatio ad 
Helviam Matrem 
 
"From everywhere it is the same distance to Heaven" 
Th. Moore (1515), Utopia 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
From an historical, logical and cultural point of view - as the Appendix to the 
present paper shows - there are three forms of integration of the "alien" in an 
"homogenous" community of nationals, who have been residing in a country “for 
ever”: 
– ghettoisation or apartheid, where diversity is recognised but not valued and is 
therefore even marginalised to the point of segregating it completely from the 
"core society"; 
– assimilation (in the forms of closed or open), where diversity is not accepted, it 
has no value (in the closed form), or has a limited value (in its open form); 
therefore it is completely (or partially) unrecognised or even eliminated to the 
point that the minority is fully assimilated into the identity of the triumphant 
majority (or in a process of osmosis and transformation the minority adopts the 
manners of the majority, but the latter changes to a limited extent when in 
contact with the minority); 
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– mutual recognition, accepting and valuing diversity without segregating it; this 
is a more significant phenomenon than tolerance, because tolerance implies 
asymmetry between the tolerator and the tolerated, while in mutual recognition 
there is a reciprocal respect. 
In the post-war process of its economic and social construction, the European 
Union has been following different paths ranging between open assimilation to 
mutual recognition. The former arises in the attempts, either negotiated between 
partners or proposed by Community institutions, to attain harmonisation, co-
ordination, convergence, strengthened co-operation, through peer pressures or moral 
suasion, looking at benchmarks or at best practices2. These are all forms of 
mediation, compromise, variable geometry between Member States, which show a 
certain degree of success, but also many failures, mainly because they are unable to 
accept unity in diversity making the large, existing heterogeneity in Europe a form 
not of weakness but of wealth. This is indeed the very gist of the principle of mutual 
recognition: its symbolic value can be easily perceived simply by thinking that, if the 
American currency bears the caption "ex pluribus unum", the Euro motto becomes 
"unity in diversity", as stated in her May 4 2000 speech by Mme. Nicole Fontaine, 
Chairperson of the European Parliament. 
Mutual recognition has irreversibly entered the European Union markets since the 
1979 European Court of Justice ruling on the Cassis de Dijon. Since then, it has 
prompted an innovative and effective convergence process on the commodity, 
service, capital sectors: the latter derives from the elimination of barriers to entry, 
from the competition of different standards and country-systems, with consequent 
enhancing of the goods’ quality and quantity, cost reduction, knowledge enlargement. 
Mutual recognition helps the Union finding its original spirit, namely making 
competition an harmonious instrument for economic, social and civil development, 
where efficiency and equity grow together. 
The principle of mutual recognition, by revealing the acceptance of the sovereignty 
of European Member States and of their rules on a perfectly equal basis, not only is 
already operational in many fields, but it is also potentially applicable in various 
others, from economics to law, from private markets to Welfare States. Indeed, we 
share Delors’ White Paper (European Commission, 1985) idea that “mutual 
recognition of national provisions, according to agreed procedures, should be the 
fundamental principle” on European markets. It is no coincidence that, as stressed in 
the Presidency Conclusions of the European Council in Tampere (European Council, 
1999), the Union is widening its scope even going towards "enhanced mutual 
recognition of judicial decisions…The European Council therefore endorses the 
principle of mutual recognition which, in its view, should become the cornerstone of 
judicial co-operation in both civil and criminal matters within the Union. The 
principle should apply both to judgements and to other decisions of judicial 
authorities" (Point. 33 of the “Concluding Remarks”).  
Apparently the principle of mutual recognition seems able to promote the four 
fundamental freedoms foreseen by the Treaty of Rome. However - unlike what 
                                               
2 On this issue, see the “Introduction” to the ISAE 2002 Annual Report on the State of the European Union  (see 
Kostoris Padoa Schioppa, hereafter labelled as FKPS, 2002a). 
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happens on the commodity, service and capital markets - not only it is far from being 
adopted in the labour market, but the European Union endorses in this sector an 
opposite principle, named "equal treatment", while labelling the mutual recognition 
as a form of “social dumping”. Given that the labour market problems cannot be 
discussed without a joint consideration of social protection policies, one has also to 
add that European Welfare States generally utilise host rather than home country 
rules, contrary to the principle of mutual recognition. However, there are no deep, 
logical reasons for using opposite principles in one of the four fundamental European 
freedoms. Quite the reverse, on a logical ground, it is unlikely that, in spite of 
different standards and legislations, European Member States are able to be 
equivalent in protecting health, environment and the cultural heritage, but not 
workers' rights. Thus, Nicolaïdis (2000) seems correct in saying (the italics is ours) 
“formally, mutual recognition can be defined as…a transfer of regulatory authority 
from the host State (or jurisdiction) where a transaction takes place, to the home State 
(or jurisdiction) from which a product, a person, a service or a firm originate. This in 
turn embodies the general principle that if a professional can operate, a product be 
sold or a service provided lawfully in one jurisdiction, they can operate, be sold or 
provided freely in any other participating jurisdiction, without having to comply with 
the regulations of these other jurisdictions".  
In what follows we will analyse the main reasons for the observed facts concerning 
the advantages of mutual recognition in three out of the four European freedoms 
(Section 2). We will then see the disadvantages of using an opposite principle in 
Union’s labour markets and Welfare States. Some possible extensions of the principle 
of mutual recognition in these fields will thus be proposed: using a simple theoretical 
game theory model, the positive implications on labour mobility and on the fight 
against the European classical unemployment will be shown (Section 3). Section 4 
will illustrate some policy-conclusions. 
 
  
2. RULES AND REGULATIONS ON MUTUAL RECOGNITION IN THE 
EUROPEAN UNION MARKETS 
As it is well known, mutual recognition3 enters the judicial and applicative corpus 
of the Union in an irreversible way after the publishing of the famous European Court 
of Justice (ECJ) ruling, called Cassis de Dijon (Court of Justice, 1979). Up to then, 
the Cassis sale was forbidden in Germany, as the German law envisaged a mandatory 
minimum alcohol content (at least 32°) for alcoholic beverages to be marketed: 
strangely enough, the proliferation of low alcohol percentages was thought to induce 
an addiction towards alcohol more than highly alcoholic beverages. This provision, 
                                               
3 This wording is traditionally accepted. However Weiler (1997) prefers the term “functional parallelism”, because for 
imports-exports the existing standards of one Member State have to functionally correspond to those of the others. 
According to Weiler, this explains “the practical failure of the principle of mutual recognition. In many cases, there 
are lines of products created on the basis of regulatory regimes with substantial differences, among which there does 
not exist a functional parallelism. In this situation, only standard harmonisation may solve the question and it cannot 
be reached through the jurisdictional instruments; moreover, in some cases, the very nature of the product requires 
one standard for the whole of Europe”. Admittedly, the implicit assumption of the present paper is different from 
Weiler’s position.  
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hampering the import of the Cassis de Dijon originating in France - with an alcohol 
percentage of 15/20% - was alleged to protect German consumers, but in fact was 
likely to protect the interest of beer producers. 
In the absence of common rules, the ECJ, though recognising that each Member 
State has the right to autonomously legislate the sale of products within its own 
territory, affirms that this national regulation cannot counter art. 284 of the Treaty (ex 
art. 30), which would be violated whenever the import of a good lawfully produced 
and marketed in another Member State is impeded, unless this is justified by 
"emergency measures"5. Specifically, one cannot state that, if the Cassis de Dijon is 
not damaging French citizens, it could damage German people. Each State is free in 
choosing its own regulation, but in a system based on mutual recognition, when 
importing a good, it has to acknowledge the rules adopted by others and, if national 
standards are different from foreigners’,  the sending (home) country and not the 
receiving (host) country rules have to be applied.  
 
Mutual recognition, equivalence, competition and harmonisation 
Before 1979, the existing regulations were identically utilised both for domestic 
and imported goods and services and therefore this seemed to have  no discriminatory 
or protectionist implications within Member States. In practice, on the contrary, by 
hampering the access to national markets of commodities produced elsewhere in 
Europe with different standards, they eventually proved discriminatory. The Court 
underlines that not only the Union body of laws  prohibits any restriction to intra-
Community trade, but also stresses a positive task6, i.e. mutual recognition between 
Member States: the presumption has to be that goods, services and capital produced 
by each of them with a different regulation can and must have access to all Union 
                                               
4 The legal fundaments of the principle of mutual recognition in the commodity and service markets derive from arts. 
28-30 (ex arts. 30 and 36) within Part Three – Title I (Free movement of goods), Chapter 2 (Prohibition of 
quantitative restrictions between Member States) of the Treaty, which prohibit any restriction on imports and exports 
or any “measure having equivalent effect”. Upon initiative of the Commission, in 1983 an agreement between 
European countries was reached, as set in Directive n. 83/189/EEC, now replaced by the wider Directive n. 98/34/EC 
of the European Parliament and Council. This started a mutual information and consulting  procedure between 
Member States putting the Commission at the centre  of the system and having the objective to prevent - upon 
adoption of technical ruling on the part of Member States - the emerging of any trade barrier mining the Single 
Market development. In practice, Member States have to notify to Brussels and to their partners any product which is 
not mutually recognised, which assumes that renouncing to objections on a given product is a signal of readiness to 
let it be marketed in one's territory. It was not necessary to officially introduce the principle of mutual recognition in 
capital movements, because capital mobility is almost perfect: its globalisation - and the fact that pecunia non olet - 
make it difficult to understand the origin and destination of capital flows and therefore imply that this area is an 
effective Single Market. On the basis of arts. 56-60 of the Treaty (ex art. 73 B-73 G), great progress was made to fully 
attain free capital movement. In particular, art. 56 prohibits any restriction to capital movements. To this end, for 
example in the banking sector, Directive n. 89/646/EEC of the Council states the mutual recognition of 
authorisations. The exceptions to free capital movement are mainly limited to movements with third countries and are 
subject to Community decisions. Member States - in keeping with art. 58 letter (b) of the Treaty (ex art. 73 D) - 
maintain the faculty to take all required measures, which are justified on grounds of public policy to prevent 
infringements of national laws and regulations, in particular in the field of the taxation and the prudential supervision 
of financial institutions. 
5  Derogations to the principle of mutual recognition and to the consequent free movement of goods depend on justified 
reasons of public morality, public policy or public security. "Such prohibitions or restrictions – says the Treaty -  shall 
not, however, constitute a means of arbitrary discrimination or a disguised restriction on trade between Member 
States". 
6  Some authors, including J. Pelkmans, identify within the structure of the Treaty of Rome mutual recognition as a 
negative complementary form of integration rather than as a substitute to harmonisation.   
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countries, provided in their home country they do not damage the consumers' health, 
do not cause irreversible harm to the natural and artistic environment, protect 
ownership and economic agents in incomplete and asymmetric information. This 
confirms the idea that legal harmonisation is not always necessary for the European 
construction and that the substitution of national with Community norms is not a 
must. Delor's White Paper (European Commission, 1985) strongly reiterates that the 
harmonisation of national laws through the definition of common rules at a European 
level should remain an exception limited to specific areas, stating in particular for the 
goods market that "in the future, legal convergence (Council Directive pursuant to 
art. 100, art. 94 since the Treaty of Amsterdam) will be limited to the setting of the 
main requisites in health care and safety which will be mandatory in all Member 
States…Whenever harmonisation of legislations is not considered essential either in 
terms of health care or safety or in terms of industry, the immediate and full 
recognition of different quality standard rules, of different provisions on food 
composition , etc. must be the rule". 
A new approach based on the respect of different national regulations is, therefore, 
emerging: each legislation has its own (same and different) ways to protect public 
interests. Thus, harmonisation must limit itself to minimum, sometimes only optional, 
standards and has to concern only fundamental aspects.  Moreover, mutual 
recognition, being an instrument of competition in regulation, in the end leads to 
regulation convergence within the European Union without any top-down 
harmonisation process.  
Reciprocal  recognition of technical rules, procedures and certificates within the 
Union assumes that there exists a similarity in the level of protection of different 
Member States or, as Nicolaïdis (2000) puts it, that there exist «”equivalence", 
"compatibility" or at least "acceptability" of the counterpart's regulatory system». 
This aspect is thoroughly illustrated in many European official documents. For 
example, the Council in July 1984 states that "the objectives pursued by the Member 
States are generally equivalent" (European Council, 1984).   
Thus, it is sufficient for Member States to share their public interest and regulatory 
goals, in order to accept mobility flows and promote trade. This is, indeed, an 
ongoing process for three out of the four freedom areas defined by art. 14 (ex art. 7 
A, Point 2) of the European Community Treaty referring to the internal market: no 
frontiers exist in it for goods, persons, services and capital. This strong implication of 
the principle of mutual recognition is often reiterated by the European institutions, 
although with some oscillations and ambiguity. For example, the Commission’s 
Communication of June 16, 1999 (European Commission, 1999a) states that "the 
principle of mutual recognition plays a central role in the Single Market by ensuring 
free movement of goods and services without making it necessary to harmonise 
national legislation…The principle of mutual recognition plays a key part in opening 
the Single Market in all the sectors which have not been the subject of harmonisation 
measures at Community level or which are covered by minimal or optional 
harmonisation measures…It is perfectly in keeping with the Single Market 
philosophy, whereby the home State principle prevails". 
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“Equal treatment” and “social dumping” 
Today mutual recognition in Europe is adopted in (almost) all markets of goods (a 
partial exception concerns pharmaceuticals) and services (think to higher education 
diplomas or to professional equivalence), while the capital market already enjoys 
quasi-perfect mobility and globalisation. It is not, however, extended to the labour 
market and social protection, where assimilation is the general rule: specifically,  an 
individual who decides to move from one European Member State to another to 
reside and be active has the right to work7 in the host State at the same conditions of a 
national (arts. 3, Par. 1, letter c); 14 - ex art. 7 A -; art. 39 - ex art. 48 -; art. 43 - ex 
art. 52 - of the Treaty, Community Regulation n. 1612/68 of the Council and 
Regulation n. 1251/70 of the European Commission). In particular, Community 
employees must be treated as national workers in terms of job conditions, wages, 
firing and hiring clauses (Regulation n. 1612/68 of the Council, art. 7, Par. 1 and 4), 
social security benefits and contributions, housing opportunities, minimum income 
support, family allowances etc. (Regulation n. 1612/68 of the Council, art. 7, Par. 2 
and 3 and art. 9) and, finally, in terms of trade union membership and workers' 
representation, with the only exclusion of their participation in the management of 
bodies governed by public laws.  
This avoids many risks (but also many more opportunities) of social competition in 
Europe (Gorce, 2000; Marini, 1999). According to this approach, the principle of 
mutual recognition in the European labour markets and Welfare States is labelled as 
“social dumping”: thus, a German firm today can import the Cassis from Dijon,  but 
if it asks Dijon workers to emigrate to Germany and produce the Cassis in the Rhein 
valley, it cannot pay them the French wage, granting the French national holiday of 
July 14 and promising the French pension; paradoxically, having to pay the German 
wage, it can even offer less than the French minimum income because, otherwise, it 
would be accused of discrimination. This almost absurd situation stems from a 
peculiar interpretation of the principle of “equal treatment”. Indeed, while stating at 
art. 12 (ex art. 6) of the Treaty that "any discrimination on grounds of nationality 
shall be forbidden", the factual result is to protect national workers from other 
European workers' potential competition, letting these foreign people believe that this 
is the only way to protect them from any possible exploitation in host countries: 
inexplicably this competition is called "unfair", as if guaranteeing a worker coming 
from a European Member State the economic and social settings he/she would 
receive in his/her home State would lead him/her to be like a Third World immigrant 
without guarantees. This approach would be adequate for more heterogeneous 
situations in the home and host countries, but it seems hard to adapt to the Single 
Market, where the fundamental social rights are clearly defined and are similar 
everywhere. 
A concrete example of how mutual recognition was denied in this field on the basis 
of a misunderstood concept of “social dumping” refers to the well-known episode 
occurred in the nineties in the building sector, during the reconstruction of Eastern 
                                               
7 The Treaty (art. 39, ex art. 48, Par. 3) states that the Member States may refuse to a Community citizen the entry and 
stay in their territory exclusively on grounds of public policy, public security or public health. With Directive n. 
64/221/EEC of February 25 1964 of the Council, and in particular by means of a thorough Court of Justice number of 
cases, those limits are strict and well identified.  
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German regions (ex GDR). The latter was prompting large flows of foreign firms and 
labour force, because - on the basis of the existing rules - competition was open to all 
Europeans. As these job-seekers were ready to accept lower wages and less 
privileged employment conditions compared to Western German workers, the direct 
advantage of these unemployed would have also implied a lower cost of new 
buildings and therefore additional benefits for German consumers and firms. 
Nevertheless, the phenomenon worried German trade union leaders  who, to protect 
their basis, asked and obtained from the German Government a law - named 
Arbeitnehmer-Entsendegesetz (Law on Posted Workers) of February 26 1996 - 
imposing8 a minimum wage for posted workers living in Germany. The result of that 
initiative was a loss in efficiency and in wellbeing, also because the degree of social 
protection offered to ex GDR German workers decreased. That situation gave rise to 
a subsequent intervention on the part of the Commission, which produced Directive 
n. 96/71/EC of the European Parliament and Council: though restating the principle 
of the free movement of workers, the legitimacy of those provisions was confirmed 
under the assumption that any form of foreigners' exploitation should be avoided, as 
indicated in what are known as European "social clauses".  
Without denying - and indeed restating - the legal and civil value of non-
discrimination, the univocal interpretation  provided by the Community legislation 
and by the ECJ rulings on labour and social protection policies does contribute, in our 
opinion, to limit free circulation of persons within the European Union. So workers 
who decide to move to another Member State have the right to be fully assimilated to 
residents in the host State, while they have no right to maintain their original home 
country identities. In other words, the right to diversity is not recognised in the 
receiving State, assimilation remaining the only feasible solution. Equal treatment 
does not hold for all those who are born in the same  State, but only for those who 
work in the same country, which means that legislation and geographical localisation 
always coincide.   
 
The minimum threshold 
The adoption of the principle of mutual recognition in the European labour markets 
and Welfare States would not mean denying the “equality of treatment” objective, but 
criticising its current European interpretation. Something different should be 
proposed, whereby the identities of single citizens coming from different Member 
States and the national legislations' peculiarities would be respected. 
                                               
8 The German Law on Posted Workers envisages that even employers residing outside the area of competence of 
bargaining agreements must respect statutory minimum standards on minimum wage, minimum length of holidays, 
minimum holiday bonuses and on any system of holiday funds (Urlaubskassen) for payments of holiday bonuses. 
This holds true provided those collective bargainings have obtained the so-called erga omnes effectiveness. At 
present, this pre-requisite applies to German collective bargaining in the sectors of construction and other 
construction-related services (electric, fitting, installation, etc..). Any breach of the provisions is punishable as an 
administrative offence and implies a fine up to one million of Euros. The minimum wage for construction, determined 
through a Decree law, amounts on September 1 2000 to approximately 37 Euros per hour in old Federal Länder and 
to 33 Euros per hour in new Federal Länder. Since September 2001, it has grown. In 1999, according to the 
Bundesanstalt für Arbeit (Federal Institute on Labour), more than 19,000 proceedings were started for violations to 
the Arbeitnehmer-Entsendergesetz. Fines and penalties amounted to about 152 millions of Euros. Data prove to what 
extent this law is binding.  
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To this end, it is worth recalling that the principle of mutual recognition requires 
two well-separated phases: a minimum threshold - namely a hard “core” common to 
all legislations, for example in the Cassis de Dijon  case, the health care goal -, plus 
additional elements which may differ  but are accepted under the assumption that 
nobody tries to impose a super-identity aimed at violating the infra-identity, on the 
basis of the mutual confidence of different participants (individuals, communities, 
States) in the construction of the same social, economic and political Community. 
It is, therefore, of the utmost importance to understand how to set this minimum 
standard in the employment and social protection sectors9 knowing that, in order to 
be shared and efficient, such a minimum cannot annul the European  acquisitions in 
terms of Welfare and fundamental social rights; conversely it must be used to support 
the smooth and fair labour market functioning. 
Should the European economic-social convergence  process  take place in the 
absence of an agreement on such a hard “core”, with the only (second phase of) 
mutual recognition, the competitive game between country-systems in European 
labour markets and Welfare States would lead to a "minimum of minima" which 
would not represent, however, a situation of unacceptable lack of civil cohesion or of 
“social dumping”, as this minimum would correspond to a standard of workers' 
dignity and safety guaranteed by the laws of the least protective country in Europe.  
Theoretically, there are various alternatives for the identification of the minimum 
threshold in the European labour markets and Welfare States. A first one consists of 
setting minimum standards through a selective harmonisation process, with a 
Community-level concertation between the representatives of the European 
institutions, national Governments and social parties. A second one derives from a 
mediation between Member States through a benchmarking aimed at identifying 
“good or best practices” under the hypothesis of transferability. Something of this 
kind is under way10, although inspired by different purposes, through the method 
known as open co-ordination in keeping with the Lisbon strategy11 (European 
                                               
9  It would be misleading to face those questions only in terms of wage and job conditions. One should go beyond and 
tackle problems such as health care and pension at the same time: it is for this very reason that labour market 
problems should be dealt with together with social protection ones. 
10 This is part of the European employment strategy, initially launched by the European Council during its Luxembourg 
summit of November 1997. The European Union identified four areas of action (four pillars): improve employability; 
develop entrepreneurship; encourage firms' and employees' adaptability; strengthen policies for equal opportunities.  
In 2000, also the debate on common social policies became more demanding: the responses were the European 
Councils in Lisbon (March), in Santa Maria de Feira (June) and in Nice (December). In this phase, indicators and 
benchmarks were fixed to evaluate the situation reached and progress made in each Member State. The Commission's 
Document drawn up for the European Council in Lisbon proposes quantity objectives not only for employment, but 
also for social exclusion. In June 2001 all Member States submitted their National Action Plans on Social Inclusion in 
response to the common objectives on poverty and social exclusion agreed by the European Union at Nice (see 
European Council, 2000b). The Lisbon strategy - which embodies the Koln and Luxembourg processes - represents 
an important reference point  for the innovations in European labour markets and social policies. It is carried out 
through the "small-step method" suggested by Jean Monnet since the very beginning of the European creation. But it 
would be wrong to think that those steps have already triggered a change,: as Pelkmans (2001) says: "The 
Luxembourg process  does not really face the legal overprotection of insiders on the labour relevant market and other 
rigidities, but only identifies the answers to structural unemployment in the development of competencies, 
employability and active policies". 
11 Admittedly, since that European Council (March 2000) a series of objectives and priority actions have been fixed for 
labour and social protection. In particular, three areas of actions were identified: the development of a competitive 
and dynamic economy, based on knowledge; the modernisation of the European social model, through interventions 
to enhance the human capital quality and to construct an active Welfare State (the first objective being to bring the 
European employment rate from the present figure of 61% to 70% and female employment rate from 51% to 60% by 
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Council, 2000a).  A third possibility consists of referring to already-existing common 
rules in the European Union, with reference to the labour market and social 
protection: the alternatives range from the very wide so-called acquis 
communautaire12 - including the whole body of political and legal frameworks 
arising in the European Union in this area - to the narrower set established in the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (European Parliament, 
Council and European Commission, 2000), to a possibly intermediate one, such as 
the Community Charter of Workers' Fundamental Social Rights  (European Council, 
1989) or the European Social Charter (Council of Europe, 1961). If the acquis 
communautaire seems excessive as a minimum threshold on which mutual 
recognition should be based - moreover, there are too many elements in it contrasting 
with this principle -, the recent Charter of Fundamental Rights risks to be insufficient, 
because it is too concise and ambiguous. Suffice it to think to the difficulties of 
interpretation raised in a multi-ethnical and multi-religious society by its art. 3, Point 
1, stating that "everyone has the right to respect for his or her physical and mental 
integrity". So, those who draw inspiration from the so-called Jewish-Christian 
tradition would be ready to respect the choice of infibulation? And if not, why should 
one consider more acceptable circumcision, which is practised by Jews and Muslims? 
And the latter couldn't discuss the mental integrity of those who base their deepest 
love belief on a cruel act such as crucifixion?  
 
3.  PROPOSALS FOR THE INTRODUCTION OF MUTUAL RECOGNITION 
IN THE EUROPEAN LABOUR MARKETS AND WELFARE STATES  
The principle of mutual recognition is sometimes used or proposed with reference 
to the free circulation of human capital in European markets. Examples are witnessed 
in the area of University and higher education curricula and diplomas, in professional 
qualifications as well as in corporate taxation13. Its adoption in these fields favours - 
as pointed out in other papers of this volume - the quality and the quantity of human 
capital; in particular, self-employed are encouraged to move and be active within the 
European Union. As we already explained, the current situation is totally different for 
employees, who represent the majority in the employment pool. This is why the 
present analysis concentrates on the potential utilization of the principle of mutual 
recognition more generally on the labour market and on social protection, the two 
being, for intuitive reasons,  strictly related one to the other.  
                                                                                                                                                            
2010); the co-ordination of macroeconomic policies with the goal of consolidating the public finance equilibrium, 
guaranteeing its sustainability and improving its quality. 
12 The main legal acts to which the acquis communautaire  may be traced back  with reference to employment and 
social protection policies are the Treaty of Rome (1957); the first Social Action Programme (1974); the Treaty on 
European Union (1986); the second Social Action Programme and the Community Charter of the Fundamental 
Workers' Social  Rights (European Council, 1989); the Treaty of Maastricht “Protocol on Social Policy” (1992); the 
third Social Action Programme (1994); the Treaty of Amsterdam (1997). 
13 Two opposite fiscal approaches are proposed in Europe, namely the competition-based and the harmonisation-based 
ones. On the one hand, tax competition à-la-Tiebout  (Tiebout, 1956) favours factor mobility, though probably 
causing losses  in tax revenues and is closer to the mutual recognition viewpoint; on the other hand, tax harmonisation 
provides Member States “more effective instruments to fight against erosion” (European Commission, 1996), though 
tax co-ordination at the European level is no easy goal. With regard to corporate taxation, the Stockholm Group 
(1999) outlines that mutual recognition applied to it could be a useful instrument to avoid double taxation, reduce 
transaction and  administrative costs, favour foreign direct investments and growth. 
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But, first, let us recall that there already exist few examples in Europe of factual 
adoption of the principle of mutual recognition both in health care and in pension 
schemes, even though this is by no means the general rule. The latter is mainly found 
in Council Regulations n. 1408/71 and 574/7214, which concern social protection of 
employees, self-employed and members of their families moving within the European 
Union.  
In particular, two criteria are usually followed in European Welfare States: 
"affiliation" and "totalisation". According to the former, the worker's treatment is 
disciplined under the legislation of one Member State in turn, namely the State where 
the individual is working15 (even though he/she resides in another Member State). 
This means that, for the whole working period in one European country, 
contributions are paid and rights are acquired on the basis of the legislation enforced 
in that country. 
This goes alongside with the “totalisation” of the years of contribution paid 
throughout the whole individual life-cycle, so as to satisfy the conditions for 
entitlement to benefits in kind or in cash16. Art. 25 of the 1971 Regulation states that 
persons resigning from their jobs are subject to the legislation of the Member State in 
whose territory they reside. Art. 10 adds that "with regard to invalidity benefits, old-
age and survivors' pensions, acquired under the legislation of one or more Member 
States, they shall not be subject to any reduction, modification, suspension, 
withdrawal or confiscation"; and the recipients will not be penalised by the fact that 
they might reside in the territory of a Member State other than that in which the 
institution responsible for payment is located. Art. 19 says that, with regard to 
sickness and maternity benefits, European workers “residing in the territory of a 
Member State other than the competent State” or who are abroad or wish to receive 
medical treatment elsewhere, are entitled to obtain benefits in kind or cash in a 
Member State other than the competent State under specific circumstances and 
according to specific modalities.  
 
Existing general rules for social protection in Europe 
Thus, workers moving within the European Union are usually subject to the host 
State rules of social protection in general and of health care and pension schemes in 
particular, but their past contribution history is considered. This partial recognition of 
the worker's origin perhaps paves the way to the possible creation of a Welfare 
System fully based on mutual recognition, which would enable not only contributions 
                                               
14 An updated version of all the modifications of these Council Regulations can be read in the Official Journal of the 
European Commission n. 28 of January 30 1997.  A simplified description of those provisions are provided in 
European Commission (2000). 
15 An exception to this rule occurs when the working period abroad lasts less than 12 months and for particular 
categories of workers: public employees who continue to be covered by their reference administration; people 
employed on board of vessels who are insured in the State which the ship belongs to; persons serving in the armed 
forces; persons employed by diplomatic missions and consular posts. People usually working in more than one 
Member State are ensured with (and thus subject to the legislation of) the Member State of residence, if he/she carries 
out part of his/her work in that country. For workers employed in one State and self-employed in another State, the 
rules of the State of employment prevail. 
16 All contribution periods are considered:  those envisaging at least one year of contribution are afferent to the country 
where they were paid, those with shorter length are afferent to the country where the worker became eligible to 
pension. 
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but also all the social protection eligibility criteria and benefit formulas enforced in 
the country of origin to maintain their validity in the destination State. In any case the 
general principle of continuity, valid for all Welfare instruments, marks a 
fundamental step in the European legislation, as it lays the basis for labour mobility 
within the Community, without penalising the Union workers and without 
compromising their social security benefits. In particular, Title III “Special provisions 
relating to the various categories of benefits” states this continuity criterium in the 
European citizens' active life-cycle: the whole working history (spent in whichever 
Member State of Europe) is considered  while evaluating the eligibility and 
contributive conditions for sickness and maternity benefits, invalidity and old-age 
transfers, survivors' pensions, benefits in respect to work accidents and occupational 
diseases, death grants, unemployment benefits and family allowances. This principle 
of continuity has two consequences. Firstly, in case of social benefits covering 
specific risks (death grants, sickness benefits, occupational diseases or unemployment 
benefits) and general risks for which special benefits are provided without a fair 
actuarial basis contribution, the Member State where the worker is active upon the 
emerging of the circumstance is responsible for the payment of the whole benefit. 
Secondly, for funded benefits closely linked to the contributions paid by each worker, 
the minimum eligibility requisites must take due account of the whole active life, 
though it is up to each Member State to get the economic responsibility for the 
benefit payment in proportion to the working life portion which the citizen spent in 
that specific State.  
The 1971 Council Regulation also comprises specific rules (Title II, 
“Determination of the legislation applicable”) in favour of employees temporarily 
posted to another Member State17. The posting duration is important as, if the period 
of posting abroad does not exceed 12 months, it creates a situation which derogates to 
the general rule whereby, with regard to social protection18, employees and self-
employed are subject to the legislation of the Member State where they carry out 
their activities: in fact, posted employees are insured in their home Member State and 
continue to pay their mandatory social security  contributions to their home State; 
however, they are entitled to all health care benefits in kind in the country where they 
work irrespective of their transferring their residence or not, and to receive the family 
allowances in the country where they are insured irrespective of  their families' place 
of residence.  
It already appears that, in spite of the general regulation on social protection which 
usually applies the host country criteria, there are some noticeable derogations. Few 
additional traces of mutual recognition exist in some European health care and 
pension rules. We now discuss about these particular sectors.  
                                               
17 A posted employee is a person employed in the territory of a Member State by an undertaking to which he/she is 
normally attached, whose main location is in the territory of another Member State, to perform work for a maximum 
period of 12 months; the latter may be prolonged to 24 months in exceptional cases.  
18 What stated only concerns social protection of posted employees. As for the labour legislation regarding them, the 
central document is Directive n. 96/71/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council, which gives binding rules 
on the minimum working conditions which an employer in the host Member State must guarantee to posted 
temporary employees. The Directive states that the latter have to receive the same employment conditions offered to 
others in the Member State where the work is carried out (maximum work periods, minimum paid annual holidays, 
minimum wage, safety and hygiene at work, equality of  treatment between men and women etc.); obviously there are 
no obstacles to supplying even more favourable terms.  
 13
Health care  
Within the European Union, the National Health System (NHS) is exclusive 
responsibility of Member States, on the basis of the principle of subsidiarity and of 
other norms stated in the Amsterdam Treaty. However, the Community legislation on 
the Single Market and some recent rulings of the Court of Justice (the 1998 Kohll-
Decker and the 2001 Smits-Peerbooms judgements) significantly influence NHS 
policies.  
In each Member State, the NHS consists of many sub-markets subject to the 
European rules on the four fundamental freedoms of persons, capital, goods and 
services. While the impact of the Union regulation has always been felt, to some 
extent, in the supply of health care services from the viewpoint of the means of 
production (think to rules concerning the partially free movement of pharmaceuticals 
or the ongoing process on mutual recognition of University diplomas regarding 
medical staff), up to the 1998 Kohll-Decker ruling  the performance of health care 
from the viewpoint of demand, namely of patients, has not been a central part of the 
European Union legislation.  
To facilitate the free movement of workers19, Regulations 1408/71 and 574/72  
envisage a co-ordination of Member States' NHS. In particular, they foresee what 
follows:  
- cross-country commuting workers and the members of their families are entitled 
to receive health care both in their home country and in their host country; 
- European Union citizens requiring medical attention for emergency reasons may 
have access to the NHS of Member States during any temporary stays abroad; 
- an individual from one Member State is entitled to medical support on the same 
basis as nationals in another Member State if authorised by the competent 
institution in his/her own State.  
In those three situations, the cost of the treatment is covered initially by the 
Member State providing it and then the latter is refunded by the home country. The 
host country principle is enforced, as the citizen is treated according to the conditions 
and tariffs of the destination State and not according to the modalities of the sending 
State NHS (otherwise, there would be mutual recognition on the NHS). This setting is 
however strongly mined by the two recent judgements of the Court mentioned above. 
In the Kohll-Decker ruling, the ECJ awards two Luxembourg citizens the right to 
obtain reimbursement for health care services provided in another Member State on 
the basis of the reimbursement tariff applicable in their home country, without prior 
authorisation having been given by these individuals' health insurance fund. The 
ruling also declares that the prior authorisation system constitutes a barrier to the four 
freedoms (the ECJ considers medical treatment as a service) and that Regulation 
1408/71, though remaining in force, is no exhaustive list of all cases when European 
citizens may have access to the NHS of other Member States. 
                                               
19 In the past there were no European-level initiatives aimed at developing a specific legislation  on the distribution of 
health care services for all the population of the Union. Notice that, on the basis of Regulations 1408/71 and 574/72 - 
except for emergency situations or for situations where a prior authorisation was required (and de facto this 
authorisation was limited and was under the full discretion of the competent institution of the Member country 
concerned)- , the right to have access to medical treatment in another Member State derived from the working status 
of the individual more than from the European citizenship. 
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Thus, for the time being, there is a double reimbursement system for medical costs 
paid in Member States other than those of “affiliation”:  
a. Regulation 1408/71 states that costs must be reimbursed according to the 
tariffs of the country where medical treatment is provided; 
b. the Kohll-Decker ECJ ruling envisages that costs must be reimbursed 
according to the tariffs of the home country. 
This ruling apparently implies a principle of mutual recognition because, according 
to the procedure created by the ECJ, patients are not integrated in the host country 
NHS, but they are treated abroad following the modality and tariffs of their own 
NHS. 
The subsequent Smits-Peerbooms judgement of July 2001 - concerning the cases 
of two Dutch citizens who received medical treatment abroad without prior 
agreement from their health care providers -, on the one hand, reiterates that the rules 
on the free movement of services also concern medical treatment and services in 
kind, and that prior authorisation is justified so as to enable Member States to have an 
adequate planning of medical care activities, but, on the other hand, it is more 
innovative: indeed, the Court clarifies the conditions under which the prior 
authorisation must be granted, thus narrowing the ample discretion competent bodies 
have had before. According to the 2001 ECJ ruling, the authorisation granting is no 
longer an exception but the rule, as for all medical treatment considered "normal" at 
an international level it may only be refused whenever the NHS of “affiliation” can 
provide the same or equally effective service without undue delay or lengthy waiting 
lists. 
Admittedly, the recent developments on the free movement of patients within the 
European Union, on the one side, give hope to the adoption of the principle of mutual 
recognition, but, on the other side, they require a legal intervention aimed at 
consistently and unambiguously specifying the conditions under which the 
authorisation to be treated abroad must be granted20. 
 
Mandatory pension schemes  
The criteria of "affiliation" and "totalisation", when applied to mandatory pensions, 
imply that a worker receives the benefit from each country where he/she was insured 
for at least one year. Each Member State calculates the overall pension benefits the 
worker can obtain on the basis of its own legislation, after a number of years of 
contribution equalling the overall seniority reached in all Member States and pays the 
pension share corresponding to the years spent on its own territory. A worker is 
entitled to single pension shares whenever he/she has satisfied the conditions (in 
terms of age and seniority) foreseen by each State legislation. The computation of the 
theoretical pension benefit is based on wages  (or contributions, if national 
legislations envisage so) paid in each of the Member States where the worker was 
insured, as if the worker had completed his/her whole insurance record in that 
                                               
20 To enhance the opportunity to receive medical treatment abroad and to overcome the problems stemming from the 
interpretation of Regulation 1408/71, bilateral agreements were concluded between the Netherlands and Belgium, 
between Luxembourg and its neighbours and between the United Kingdom and Ireland. The European Union 
programme INTERREG aims at prompting the economic development of border regions and foresees measures and 
initiatives to promote co-operation in medical treatment between those regions.  
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country. However, the formula to revaluate wages or contributions is the one adopted 
in his/her country of origin according to various ECJ rulings (among which C-251/94 
and C-31-32-33/96): in this case the continuity principle becomes close to the mutual 
recognition one.  
On the basis of the above-mentioned Regulations of 1971 and 1972, of later 
amendments21, updating or extensions22 of those provisions and of the ECJ rulings 
expressed through the years, one might describe in detail the mechanisms of 
mandatory pension schemes and their coverage in case of workers moving within the 
European Union. In particular, the most important rules concern the retirement age, 
the pre-requisites  - in terms of minimum contribution years - for pension entitlement, 
the general benefit formula and any minimum floor or maximum ceiling imposed on 
it, finally the possibility to cumulate pension benefits with other incomes. 
With regard to the first point, the effective retirement age is the one set in the host 
country, where the concerned person works. However, if he/she has worked in a 
country where the pensionable age is higher (lower), the right to the pension benefit 
or rather the pension share acquired in that country is available only upon reaching 
the age requisites foreseen in that State23. 
The adoption of the “totalisation” criterium enables to take into account the 
contribution years paid in other Member States, should the insurance period in a State 
be insufficient24 to be entitled to pension benefits (as confirmed by many ECJ rulings, 
the latest of which is judgement C-55/00 of January 15 2002).  That does not hold 
true for seniority pensions, i.e. pension benefits based on a minimum number of 
contribution years. However, the Draft Reform on the co-ordination of pension 
schemes submitted by the Commission  in 1998 - COM(98) 779 - states that the area 
of application of Community provisions be enlarged also to pre-retirement pension 
schemes. 
With regard to any possible minimum floor of pension benefits, the host country 
legislation prevails. Indeed, the sum of the pensions due by the various Member 
States cannot fall short of the minimum amount foreseen by the State of residence, 
provided at least a share of the overall pension benefit was acquired in it (art. 49). 
Conversely, the legislation of the country with the most generous pension scheme 
among those where the working activity has been carried out prevails for the 
application of the upper limit. Indeed, the Union provisions impose that the overall 
pension benefits do not exceed the highest theoretical amount which would be 
reached had the pensioner worked throughout his/her whole life in one single country 
and, in particular, in the country with the most advantageous scheme. 
                                               
21 A fundamental reform proposal of the 1971 and 1972 Regulations is found in the Commission’s Draft COM(98) 779, 
which envisages, among other things, the possibility to extend the Union rules on social security to all persons rather 
than to all active people and to all sectors defined by the BIT Convention number 102, including preretirement 
pensions  
22 An example is the extension of the Community legislation on the co-ordination of social security schemes for General 
Government employees. 
23 This means that, if a person has worked in a Member State where the pension age is 67 and later is working in 
another State where the pension age is 60, he/she retires at 60 by receiving the pension benefits acquired in the latter 
State and will wait till he/she is 67 to receive the pension benefit share acquired in the former State (see European 
Commission, 2000).  
24 “Totalisation” also affects the pension benefit in other cases: for example, the working periods spent elsewhere in 
Europe are considered if this enables to reach a higher benefit amount (art. 49 of the Regulation confirmed by many 
ECJ rulings, among which judgement C-244/97). 
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Regarding the possibility to cumulate pensions and labour incomes, the reduction, 
suspension or withdrawal clauses foreseen by the legislation of one Member State 
may be invoked to retirees even in the case of benefits in kind or cash obtained in 
another Member State (art. 12). A derogation to that principle is found in art. 46, 
whereby the reduction, suspension and withdrawal clauses cannot be applied 
whenever the benefit is computed pro rata, a method which must be always adopted 
if it guarantees a larger benefit as against a formula taking account of the legislation 
of only one Member State (on these aspects see also, among others, the ECJ 
judgement C-107/00 of  March 7 2002). 
 
Supplementary pension schemes  
Apart from mandatory pensions, voluntary insurance schemes have been a topic 
the European Union has been debating since the early-nineties, because it crosses 
many areas, from capital markets to Welfare, from the transferability of vested rights 
to labour mobility. Art. 9 of the Council Regulation n. 1408/71 states that "the 
provisions of the legislation of any Member State which make admission to voluntary 
or optional continued insurance conditional upon residence in the territory of the 
State shall not apply to persons resident in another Member State, provided that at 
some time in their past working life they were subject to the legislation of the first 
State as employee or self-employed persons". Besides - art. 9 continues - "where 
under the legislation of a Member State, admission to voluntary or optional continued 
insurance is conditional upon completion of a period of insurance, the periods of 
insurance or residence completed under the legislation of another Member State shall 
be taken into account, to the extent required as if they were completed under the 
legislation of the first State".  
This article, using the continuity principle in a way close to the home country 
mechanism, mirrors the will to eliminate any obstacle to labour mobility due to the 
different functioning of supplementary pension schemes in Europe, thus trying to 
avoid the risk that the various systems "do not speak at all with each other". The 
latest proposals of the European Commission on this subject go further- although 
with some ambiguity -, stressing the fact that the worker should be entitled to 
maintain the voluntary pension scheme in the Member State which he/she has 
originally chosen, irrespective of his/her movements within the Union. The initial 
supplementary pension fund is located very often in the home State, where most 
workers are likely to start their careers, precisely as stated by the principle of mutual 
recognition.  
Many laws and regulations were issued in the European Union on supplementary 
pensions. They have determined some necessary but not sufficient conditions for the 
introduction of the principle of mutual recognition on voluntary pensions. In this 
area, the introduction of this principle should be even easier25 than in mandatory 
pensions, as complementary ones are a form of financial saving and should share all 
the advantages the smooth-functioning Single Market for capital has. 
                                               
25 This  does not apply to cases, such as the Italian one, where voluntary insurance is based on closed funds not subject 
to competitive mechanisms.  
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The Commission took its first initiative on voluntary pension schemes on October 
21 1991, through a Draft Directive on freedom to manage and invest pension fund 
contributions. The proposal was pursuing the target of strengthening the free capital 
circulation, which at the time was scarce in Member States. However, the times were 
not mature for a positive solution and the proposal was withdrawn after three years' 
frantic discussions.  
On December 17 1994 the Commission published  a Communication titled A 
Single Market for Pension Funds. Upon petition of the French Government , this was 
annulled by the ECJ on March 20 1997, as it was not suitable to impose obligations to 
Member States. 
June 10 1997 marks the first fundamental step in the Community-level 
organisation of supplementary pension schemes, with the publication on the part of 
the European Commission of the Green Paper on Supplementary Pensions in the 
Single Market. The document is a well-organised and pragmatic survey on the matter. 
With its Green Paper, the Commission for the first time clearly incentivates the 
development of pillar 2 in the construction of European pension systems. In 
particular, it sets some guidelines which should be followed both at a legal and at an 
economic level, so as to prompt the gradual liberalisation of the pension funds and 
the investments done for social security goals, taking in due account the connected 
labour market variables26. The Commission identifies two main obstacles: the former 
concerns the complexity of the pre-requisites for eligibility to a supplementary 
pension scheme, for example the (long) minimum  contribution length; the latter is a 
fiscal problem and regards the differential tax27 treatment on pension incomes which 
the same worker might receive from funded insurance schemes operating in different 
Member States.  
The first Community Directive on voluntary pension schemes is dated June 29 
1998 (Council Directive n. 98/49/EC) and intends to safeguard the supplementary 
pension rights of employed and self-employed persons moving within the 
Community. In its fundamental articles (arts. 4, 5 and 6)28, it aims at eliminating the 
obstacles hampering the free movement of workers, while underlining the importance 
of maintaining the pension rights built up through both voluntary and mandatory 
pension schemes. 
The subsequent step is on May 11 1999, with the Commission Communication  
Towards A Single Market for Supplementary Pensions - COM(99)134 -. It surveys 
                                               
26 The Green Paper deals with topics such as the regulation and prudential control on pension funds operating in 
Europe, in particular minimum obligations on the pension funds pattern of investments; the need to match a good rate 
of return with stability and risk minimisation; the need to allow portability of vested rights for workers withdrawing 
from a supplementary pension fund because they move to another Member State, at least to the extent guaranteed to 
those who stop making contributions but remain within the same Member State; the need to guarantee in other 
Member States the payment of the benefits deriving from all contributions paid within all supplementary pension 
schemes the worker has subscribed during his/her working life.  
27 It is worth noticing that in the Green Paper  the European Commission (1997) leaves open the discussion on the 
opportunity to diversify the fiscal treatment of pension funds from those of other forms of life insurance schemes 
implying life annuities. 
28 Apart from those already mentioned, they state the following principles-obligations: the Member States adopt the 
necessary measures to  allow posted workers to maintain a supplementary pension scheme in one Member State 
during the period of their posting in another Member State (portability of a supplementary pension scheme within the 
Community); whenever this is applicable, posted workers and their employers are exempted from any obligation to 
make contributions to a supplementary pension scheme in the Member State where the worker is posted.  
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many relevant aspects for pension funds, including the workers’ freedom to choose 
the managing service provider in any preferred State of the Union and the equality of 
treatment for equivalent products offered by different providers. An analysis is 
suggested by kind of performances, guarantees, exposure, activity management 
supplied by pension funds; a co-ordination of supplementary pension schemes similar 
to the one already adopted for pillar 1 is proposed for migrant workers within the 
Union, together with the elimination of all possible penalisations to transfers of 
accumulated capitals; a gradual fiscal treatment convergence of supplementary 
pension schemes and of other forms of insurance investments is suggested and the 
convergence of the conditions to build up pension rights is examined. Overall, the 
spirit of this Communication seems much nearer to the harmonisation approach29 
than to the mutual recognition principle.  
In October 2000, the European Commission proposes another Directive on the 
activities of the Institution for Occupational Retirement Provisions (IORP), with the 
aim of guaranteeing a high level of protection for pensioners, creating a Single 
Market for financial services and complementary pensions and eliminating obstacles 
to the cross-border provision of professional pensions. The supervision is left to the 
authorities of the State where the pension fund is located, not necessarily equal to the 
country of work.  
The Draft Directive is followed on April 14 2001 by a Commission 
Communication – COM(2001) 214 - on the elimination of tax obstacles to  the cross-
borders provision of occupational pensions, where the need to have a fully 
functioning Single Market for occupational pensions is stressed. As outlined in the 
Communication, the tax treatment of occupational pensions in different Member 
States is very different in terms of deduction of contributions and benefit taxation, 
and might give rise to double-taxation problems in case of workers' mobility within 
the Union30. Furthermore, there are relevant differences in the tax treatment of 
pension funds according to whether they are national or established in another 
Member State31, which is a violation32 of the principle of free circulation of workers, 
services and capital (apart from goods). From this viewpoint, the Commission 
advocates33 a convergence towards EET schemes (Exempt contributions, Exempt 
                                               
29 In 1999, an Action Plan on financial services is also defined: it explicitly sets the objective of defining a consistent 
European-level  legal framework on pension funds. 
30 For instance, this may happen if a worker, after working in a TEE (Taxed contributions, Exempt investment income 
and capital gains of pension funds, Exempt benefits)  country, becomes pensioner and moves to an EET country. Vice 
versa, cases of total tax exemptions might emerge.  
31  For instance, in some Member States tax deductions granted at national level are not extended to contributions paid 
to pension funds located in another Member State; in others,  tax reliefs vary or are subject to requisites different from 
those adopted for national regimes. 
32 The Commission's Communication of 2001 explicitly mentions the Safir judgement (C-118/96), whereby a Swedish 
rule penalising premiums paid to a life insurance company established in another Member State creates an unjustified 
obstacle to the free movement of services, and the Bachmann judgement (C-204/90), whereby the Court holds that the 
Belgian legislation making the deductibility of pension and life insurance contributions conditional upon the 
institution being located in Belgium violates the principle of free movement of workers.  
33 In the same document, the Commission proposes to create pan-European pension institutions (see European 
Federation for Retirement Provision, 2000) regarding complementary pensions of multinational companies. Single 
workers, even after mobility, would continue to be enrolled to the same pension fund, though the enforced legislation 
would change. However, some might find it smoother to remain in the home country section, which is the principle 
which sometimes inspires the Commission in the area of complementary pension schemes and is welcome in a mutual 
recognition perspective.  
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investment income and capital gains of pension funds, Taxed benefits),  which are 
prevailing among Member States34.   
On June 5 2002 the ECOFIN Council reaches a political agreement on the 
Commission Draft Directive of October 2000. The European Parliament still has to 
decide. In such an agreement, according to an expert’s point of view (Capuano, 
2002), “the Directive is an instrument of minimum harmonization between different 
complementary pension systems and tends to reach the result that all Member States 
adopt a common set of rules in management and control of the pension funds”. It is 
clear even from this wording that there is a lot of ambiguity in the ECOFIN position 
because, while the “minimum harmonization” approach is consistent with the first 
step of mutual recognition, the “common set of rules” is likely to be opposite to it. In 
any case, it appears really relevant in a mutual recognition perspective, that all 
European institutions seem to agree nowadays on the necessity to “let the workers 
free, if they so like, to choose pension funds on countries different from the one 
where they work, under the conditions allowed in the Directive and in national 
norms”. 
 Summarising, as far as European complementary pensions are concerned, four 
major goals appear to exist in the Union at the moment: first, to identify the measures 
for the "coexistence" of heterogeneous schemes, for instance eliminating a possible 
differential (and double) taxation; secondly, to make supplementary pension funds 
consistent with free capital circulation; thirdly, to make them consistent with the free 
movement of workers and, finally, to let them be an instrument to alleviate the 
Welfare State from obligations which the European public finances are unable to 
sustain in the forms and ways adopted so far for mandatory pensions. It is extremely 
important, in our opinion, that the Commission intends to make really effective and 
inexpensive the portability of supplementary pension schemes set up in the country of 
origin during intra-Community movements. If and when the process of mutual 
recognition of supplementary pension systems were completed, the participation in 
pillar 2 would not be interrupted by mobility reasons and the insured worker would 
know that benefits only depend on the amount and on the length of the period of 
contributions. This should avoid all the problems and costs connected to the transfer 
of individual positions from one pension scheme to another. Admittedly, the 
portability would remain on a voluntary  basis and workers might give up whenever 
they wish. 
The creation in Europe of supplementary pension systems where workers have the 
option to maintain pillar 2 in their home countries corresponds to the introduction on 
a European scale of the principle of mutual recognition in this area. However, the 
combination of the current Union legislation on mandatory and on supplementary 
pension schemes seems very complicated in the long and medium-term. Normally, 
pillar 2 is connected, in its structure, in its functioning and sometimes in the 
determination of the levels of the involved variables, to pillar 1 and to the labour 
market regulation. Therefore a question emerges: is in the long or medium-run 
portability of supplementary pension funds, as it is conceived by the Commission, 
                                               
34 Eleven Member States have the EET system, three have the ETT scheme (among others, Italy) and two the TEE one, 
while Germany adopts both the EET and the TEE. Those acronyms are used in the European Commission  
Communication of 2001. 
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really feasible or shouldn't some sort of portability of rights be extended to 
mandatory pensions, to the health care and to the labour market variables as well? 
In our opinion, an overall and thorough reform project based on the principle of 
mutual recognition should necessarily tackle sooner or later the whole employment 
problem as much as the Welfare State. Smaller steps are, however, welcome in the 
short run, either in terms of fields of application (for example we can start with health 
care and complementary pension rules) or in terms of eligibility criteria (for example 
the mutual recognition could be initially adopted  only for those employees at a 
professional level comparable to the self-employed professionals who already benefit 
from these mutual recognition provisions), or in terms of number of partners involved 
(a strengthened co-operation in these sectors seems easier to start in countries like the 
United Kingdom or Ireland, where the Welfare States' competition is more 
appreciated).  
 
Classical unemployment and labour mobility 
While in social protection policies mutual recognition is by no means the general 
rule, but it is not even excluded from Community standards and in some cases it is 
even adopted, quite the reverse, according to the present European legislation, it is 
absolutely banned in the labour area. Thus, we deal with this problem in view of a 
potential reform, as the principle of mutual recognition may prove more effective 
than the current host country approach to increase the Union workers' mobility and 
employment, hence to raise efficiency and equity at the same time. Indeed, this is 
what happens if the following three, very plausible, assumptions hold true: a) in every 
European country there is some weak component of the labour force (some region, 
some gender, age or skill group) which is unemployed; b) unemployment is 
everywhere mainly of a classical kind, namely it is due to lack of entrepreneurial  
profitability (to an excess of labour costs, due to wage and regulatory rigidities); c) 
only job-seekers are ready to migrate, provided they find a job in the receiving 
country. Under these hypotheses, as we shall stress later through a very simple 
model, the adoption of the principle of mutual recognition in the European labour 
markets increases the mobility of (classical) unemployed, raises the labour market 
competition and reduces unemployment, while importing some flexibility in 
European countries with relatively higher wages and more rigid regulation.  
 
 
Mutual recognition and labour market rigidities: a theoretical model 
The objective of the hereafter theoretical model is to examine the impact on labour 
force mobility and consequently on employment of the adoption in the labour market 
of two alternative principles, namely the host State and the home State approaches, 
among Union countries all suffering of some (classical) unemployment, but differing 
in their wage and regulatory rigidities.  
Consider the case of two European countries, A and B, having heterogeneous 
labour market and Welfare settings, and suppose that country A (think for example of 
Italy) is characterised by high real wages and regulatory rigidities (particularly, 
overprotection on hiring and firing), while country B (Ireland, for instance) is 
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characterised by flexibility and lower wage costs. It is well known, even at an 
intermediate textbook level like Blanchard's (Blanchard, 2000), that there exists a one 
to one correspondence between real wage and regulatory rigidities (Blanchard's Z 
factor), in terms of their implications on labour costs and consequently on classical 
unemployment. From this viewpoint, Italy and Ireland are chosen because they are, to 
some extent, polar cases of rigidities35 in Europe, as indicated by Table 1. 
 
Table 1 
 
LABOUR MARKET  REGULATORY RIGIDITIES AND UNEMPLOYMENT  
Country Averag and 
standardised 
unemployment 
rate 
Change in 
unemployment 
rates between  
Nickell indicator 
based on the 
rigiditiy of "labour 
standards"b 
EPL indicator of rigidity  
in the OECD  
version 1c 
Freyssinet  
indicator of 
rigidity 
in the OECD  
version 2d 
 2000 2000 and 1990 1989-94 Late-eighties Late-nineties Late-nineties 
EU-14a    7.2 -0.2 … … … … 
Belgium (VII)   7.0 (VI)   0.3 (IV)       4 (VI)     3.1 (VIII)      2.1 (VII)        2.5 
Denmark (X)   4.7 (X)  -3.0 (V)       2 (X)     2.1 (X)      1.2 (XI)        1.5 
Germany (VI)   7.9 (III)   3.1 (II)        6 (V)      3.2 (VI)      2.5 (VI)        2.6 
Greece (II)  11.4 ….. … (III)      3.6 (II)      3.6 (II)        3.5 
Spain (I)  14.1 (IX)  -2.1 (I)        7 (II)      3.7 (IV)      3.1 (IV)        3.1 
France (V)   9.5 (V)   0.5 (II)        6 (VII)     2.7 (V)      3.0 (V)        2.8 
Ireland (XI)   4.2 (XII)   -9.2 (IV)       4 (XI)     0.9 (XI)      0.9 (XII)        1.1 
Italy (III)  10.5 (IV)   1.5 (I)       7 (I)      4.1 (III)      3.3 (III)        3.4 
The Netherlands (XiV)   2.9 (XI)  -3.3 (III)       5 (VII)      2.7 (VIII)      2.1 (IX)        2.2 
Portugal (XII)   4.1 (VII)  -0.7 (IV)       4 (I)      4.1 (I)      3.7 (I)        3.7 
United Kingdom (iX)   5.5 (VIII)  -1.6 (VI)       0 (XII)     0.5 (XII)      0.5 (XIII)        0.9 
Austria (Xiii)   3.7 … (III)       5 (IX)      2.2 (VII)      2.2 (VIII)        2.3 
Finland (IV)   9.7 (I)  6.5 (III)       5 (VIII)      2.3 (IX)      2.0 (X)        2.1 
Sweden (VIII)  5.9 (II)  4.2 (I)        7 (IV)      3.5 (VII)      2.2 (VI)        2.6 
       
OECD (for reference 
only) 
      
United States 4.0 -1.6            2  0.2 0.2 0.7 
Japan 4.7 …             1 … 2.4 2.3 
Sources and Notes: 
a. Luxembourg is not taken into account because there are no data on its labour market rigidity. For data on 
unemployment in the year 2000 see OECD (2001). The notation … means unavailable data. European countries’ 
rankings are written in italics in parenthesis in every column. All regulatory rigidities in Table 1 refer to private 
employment. For corresponding indicators in the public sector European labour markets, see ISAE (2002). 
b. See Nickell (1997), based on OECD (1994). This is a synthetic indicator on the rigidity of the legal framework on 
private employment. Its maximum value is 10 and it refers to 5 dimensions, namley working time, fixed-term 
contracts, labour potection, minimum wage and workers' bargaining rights. Each of those items has a value ranging 
between 0 (no legislation) and 2  (strict legislation): values are cumulated. 
c. See OECD (1999). This is computed as the average of the indicators referring to regular contracts (procedure 
difficulties, pre-notice and indemnity applicable to individual firings, firing difficulties) and to fixed-term contracts 
(full time or part-time). EPL means employment protection legislation. 
d. See Freyssinet (2000) and OECD (1999). This is computed as the average of the indicators referring to regular 
contracts (procedure difficulties, pre-notice and indemnity applicable to individual firings, firing difficulties), to 
fixed-term contracts (full time or part-time) and to collective firings.  
 
                                               
35 FKPS (2000) stresses the positive correlation existing in Europe between the unemployment variation in the nineties and the labour 
market degree of overprotection. The present paper highlights the positive correlation between the labour market regulatory rigidities 
and the unemployment rate in the year 2000.  
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Turning now to examine a less specific case than the one described so far, consider 
the worker M of a generic country K and the worker N of a generic country J. The 
analysed combinations of wage and regulatory rigidities in the two countries are 
four36: each country can face a situation of rigidity with overprotection and high 
wages or of flexibility with softer regulation and lower wage costs. Unemployment is 
supposed to be of a classical nature37, being caused by rigid labour costs, independent 
of the unemployment rate. By assumption, some unemployment emerges
                                               
36 A more general case  would be one where each country finds itself in one out of four, rather than out of two possibilities (high wages-low 
protection, low wages-high protection, high wages-high protection, low wages-low protection): without loss of generality, we treat only the two 
extreme cases, because they are sufficient to show that mutual recognition in the labour market enhances mobility, competition, employment. 
Again, without loss of generality, we only treat the case of two, rather than n countries.  
37 There is a large literature on this topic: among the most recent papers see, for example, Malinvaud (2000). 
in every European country even in the most flexible one. Job-seekers are ready to 
move, provided they find a job, that is provided there exists a positive labour 
demandfor them, as their reservation wage is assumed to be in every country lower 
than the market wage offered to them in any other European country (hence there 
always exists a positive labour supply - with migration - on the part of the 
unemployed). 
Mobility is here analysed both under the host State principle - that is the European 
status quo - and under the home State principle - i.e. when the principle of mutual 
recognition is potentially adopted -. 
If the host State principle holds true, the following scheme, illustrated in Table 2, 
emerges in the labour demand and supply game: 
 
Table 2 
Worker N 
Country J 
 
High wages 
High protection 
Low wages 
Low protection 
 
 
 
 
 
Worker 
M 
Country 
K 
High wages 
High 
protection 
 
M 
 
(positive supply, 
 
null demand) 
 
no movement 
N 
 
(positive 
supply, 
 
null demand) 
 
no movement 
M 
 
(positive supply, 
 
null demand) 
 
no movement 
N 
 
(positive supply, 
 
null demand) 
 
no movement 
N M N 
 
Low wages 
Low 
protection 
M 
 
(positive supply, 
 
null demand) 
 
no movement 
 
(positive 
supply, 
 
null demand) 
 
no movement 
 
(positive supply, 
 
null demand) 
 
no movement 
 
(positive supply, 
 
null demand) 
 
no movement 
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The cases along the main diagonal (top left - bottom right)  identify situations of 
non-mobility, where the choice between home and host State principles is by 
definition immaterial, because the two countries are the mere image one of the other 
(either both rigid or both flexible): the positive labour supply (given the status of 
unemployed in the worker's country of origin) is counterbalanced by the null demand, 
as there is an excessive labour supply in the country of destination. Off-diagonal, on 
the contrary, no movement is observed but for different reasons: job-seekers would 
be ready to move and to work also in the country where protection and wages are 
lower than in their home country (a fortiori in the country where wages and 
protections are higher); however, given that, once they move, they are treated as 
national workers of the host country (where by assumption there already exists some 
classical unemployment), there is no labour demand for them as there is no demand 
for the unemployed national labour force. Thus, under these hypotheses, the host 
State principle never helps job-seekers to find a job through mobility and 
consequently mobility is not observed. 
If, however, the principle of mutual recognition were applied, the demand and 
supply game would be the one indicated by Table 3: 
 
Table 3 
Worker N 
Country J 
 
High wages 
High protection 
Low wages 
Low protection 
 
 
 
 
 
Worker 
M 
Countr
y K 
High 
wages 
High 
protection 
 
M 
 
(positive supply, 
 
null demand) 
 
no movement 
N 
 
(positive 
supply, 
 
null demand) 
 
no movement 
M 
 
(positive supply, 
 
null demand) 
 
no movement 
N 
 
(positive supply, 
 
positive 
demand) 
 
movement 
M 
 
N M N 
 
Low 
wages 
Low 
protection 
(positive supply, 
 
positive  
demand) 
movement 
(positive 
supply, 
 
null demand) 
 
no movement 
(positive supply, 
 
null demand) 
 
no movement 
(positive supply, 
 
null demand) 
 
no movement 
 
In this event too, along the main diagonal (top left - bottom right) there are 
situations of non-mobility for reasons similar to those listed before: the worker  
brings all his/her characteristics with him/her, which coincide with those of the host 
State. But now there is a difference on some of the off-diagonal cases: if the job-
seeker of a low-wage/low-protection country moves to look for a job in the country 
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where wage and regulatory rigidities are higher, by bearing with him/her the labour 
market conditions of his/her home State, he/she would get a job, because the 
receiving country's employers would find profitable to hire newcomers at lower 
wages and protections than those holding in the host State, which is also in classical 
unemployment. Thus, there would be labour mobility, the overall employment would 
grow, unemployment would decrease. 
Hence, thanks to the principle of mutual recognition, not only would the classical 
unemployed of a flexible European country be hired elsewhere, but this would take 
place by raising competition and importing flexibility in rigid Union countries, thus 
leading to maximise employment of people whose home countries are more flexible 
than the average38 in Europe. It is very likely that in the medium-long run the 
adoption of the principle of mutual recognition in the European labour markets and 
Welfare States would induce the national (classical) unemployed of the receiving 
countries to ask to be non-discriminated and to be treated as immigrants coming from 
more flexible Member States. Therefore, under the mutual recognition assumption, 
initially the Irish unemployed would be hired in Italy at the Irish conditions, while 
later the Italian unemployed would look for and find an employment opportunity in 
Italy at the Irish conditions. In the end, classical unemployment would tend to decline 
and possibly to disappear. Thus, one might say with FKPS (2001a) that "initially, 
workers of different nationality with different labour contract and social security 
provision would be found within the same firm. Soon, however, each worker, 
regardless of nationality and residence, would be likely to begin to shop around for 
the best labour contract and social security provision". The principle of mutual 
recognition in the European labour markets and Welfare States, therefore, would 
imply a positive-sum game, whereby losers could be subsidised by winners. This 
contrasts with  the outcome of  the host State present approach, where no advantage 
emerges in labour mobility, and no possibility exists to decrease classical 
unemployment through migration. 
 
 
4. POLICY-CONCLUSIONS  
 
The present paper carries out a law-and-economics analysis on the impact of the 
potential (and sometimes factual) introduction of the principle of mutual recognition 
in the European labour markets and Welfare States. 
Up to now, the principle of mutual recognition has been fully or partially adopted 
in Europe in three of the four areas of the fundamental freedoms envisaged by the 
Treaty of Rome, with relevant implications for the elimination of trade barriers and 
for the circulation of goods, services and capital. Since the 1979 Cassis de Dijon 
judgement and its aftermath, competition between similar but not identical 
commodities has been spreading around and this has caused various effects which, 
from the viewpoint of an economist, are perfectly expected, namely price reduction, 
quality improvement and quantity enhancement. Perhaps this has damaged some 
                                               
38 In the case of n countries,  should the principle of mutual recognition be applied, all the unemployed of the countries which are more 
flexible than the average are likely to  find a labour demand in the high-wage/high-protection countries, starting, of course, with the full 
employment of the least rigid European country. In this case too, there would be an employment growth which would benefit 
particularly the unemployed of highly flexible countries. 
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producers, but certainly has increased efficiency together with equity, definitely to 
the advantage of the consumers’ wellbeing. Admittedly, what is interesting is that all 
these excellent results have been obtained without asking different countries to give 
up to their revealed preferences expressed in their regulations and laws. Each country 
may keep its own rules, but it cannot refuse to allow – according to the principle of 
mutual recognition – not only that different rules are enforced elsewhere, but also that 
those same rules have to be accepted for imported products and services, provided the 
latter are not harmful to health, to natural and artistic environment and the like, the 
only possible derogations being "emergency reasons". Therefore, if one proves that 
the Cassis de Dijon does not damage French consumers’ health, German people may 
have their way to determine the alcohol percentage of a beverage, but they cannot 
hamper the import of French alcoholics to Germany, as what does not harm French 
drinkers will not damage German drinkers neither. 
This conclusion, once generalised, shows two elements: first, in the transfers of 
commodities and services within Europe mutual recognition makes the home State 
rules more important than the host State ones, while a Single Market practically 
exists already for capital; second, mutual recognition – i.e. the mutual acceptance of 
one’s diversity - is based on a minimum threshold of common laws and principles 
which, in the case of the Cassis de Dijon, concern the safeguard of people's health, 
assumed to be a shared value taken care in equivalent if not identical ways 
everywhere in the Union. 
On the contrary, in one of the four sectors of the European fundamental freedoms, 
namely in the labour market, mutual recognition is not only ignored, but it is banned 
as "social dumping", while the opposite principle – the so-called "equal treatment” – 
is adopted, in spite of the fact that mutual recognition might give rise to a much fairer 
treatment. Nowadays, European workers moving to a different Member State are 
granted the right to be fully assimilated  to the host State nationals, while they are not 
entitled to maintain their identities created in their home State. They have no right to 
diversity in the receiving country, assimilation being their only option: indeed, on the 
basis of the interpretation of art. 39 of the Treaty, any form of employment, 
remuneration or protection condition different for workers residing in the same 
Member State on grounds of different nationalities is considered discriminatory. 
Hence the equality of treatment is set not for all those who are born in the same 
Member State, but for all those who are working in the same country, with full 
identity in terms of labour and social protection, between law and localisation. It is as 
if the old alternative between ius loci and ius sanguinis emerged again in a new way, 
with a systematic prevalence of the former norm. The ECJ rulings have always 
corroborated this stand, repressing any competition in the European labour markets 
due, for example, to different wages or different Welfare instruments (and the two are 
clearly interconnected), as if it were unfair.  
In our opinion, this approach is out of keeping with Delors' White Paper (European 
Commission, 1985), when it states that free movement cannot be limited in any sector 
within the European Union, while "the immediate and full recognition of different 
quality standards, of different legislations…must be the rule". If this holds true for 
goods, services and capital, it must hold true for the human capital as well, 
particularly in a European area where the fundamental social rights are similar 
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everywhere, as they represent a solid standard network where nobody falls short of 
the minimum threshold. Indeed, there are some fields of human capital where mutual 
recognition has already been adopted or at least has already been proposed by 
European institutions, for example in the equivalence of professional qualifications of 
self-employed, or in some complementary pension and health care rules, because 
these fields are considered parts of the service or of the capital markets. But the 
contiguity between the status of self-employed and the one of employed or between 
complementary and mandatory pensions is so big that it appears impossible to avoid 
at least asking what would be the potential effect of using the principle of mutual 
recognition more generally in the European labour markets and Welfare States.  
What would then be the correspondent of the minimum threshold, were the 
principle of mutual recognition applied to the labour market and social protection in 
Europe? The minimum “core” should regard current and future wages, that is labour 
incomes and pensions, working time, holidays, maternity and sickness leaves, besides 
other fundamental benefits and social rights. There are many ways to define the 
minimum threshold, for instance one might let the market reach the standards of the 
most flexible European country throug competitive pressures or one might use 
already existing common rules belonging to the wider set of the acquis 
communautaire, or one could adopt a system of limited negotiations between 
countries, just as it is happening after the Lisbon summit through the open co-
ordination in labour and Welfare matters.  
There should be a package of rights to be guaranteed everywhere in Europe, 
beyond which each country should be left free to rule its own employment and social 
protection strategies, while respecting the others', thanks to mutual recognition. 
Accepting standards beyond the minimum package means that, if the principle of 
mutual recognition were enforced, a country could employ a worker from another 
European Member State not at its own conditions, but honouring the sending country 
rules and regulations. 
A very simple theoretical model is set up with two countries and two  conditions 
for the labour market and Welfare State (one with high wages - high regulatory 
rigidity, the other with low wages - high regulatory flexibility). The model shows the 
effects obtained in terms of labour mobility and employment by turning from the 
present system – based on "equal treatment" (the host country principle) – to an 
opposite one – based on mutual recognition (the home country system) -: under the 
assumption that in all European countries there exist some unemployed of a classical 
type (due to excessive rigidities) and that job-seekers of a Member State are ready to 
move to another Member State provided they get a job, one finds that labour mobility 
in Europe would rise as would employment. There would be no unequal treatment, 
because the present concept of “equal treatment” states that “all workers living in one 
country are equal”, while the principle of mutual recognition would mean that “all 
workers coming from one country are equal”.  
In particular, the model illustrates why an unemployed living in a low-wage and 
low-protection State nowadays does not move elsewhere in Europe, the reason being 
that he/she would not find a job: with the host country principle there are no reasons 
for the employers of a high-wage and high-protection country to hire foreign workers 
coming from the rest of Europe, because once they have moved, they become 
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absolutely identical to national workers. For example, Italian employers would never 
hire Irish job-seekers (though coming from a flexible and low-wage country) at 
Italian conditions, but they would hire them at Irish conditions, namely under the 
hypothesis of mutual recognition. Italians would maintain their own rigidities because 
mutual recognition enables that, but after a while they would possibly change their 
attitude, particularly under the pressure of the weakest components of the Italian 
labour force (women, youngsters, Southern): indeed, after some time, also the Italian 
unemployed would not accept to be “discriminated” compared to Irish job-seekers 
and would require to be treated as any other European unemployed. This should be 
allowed out of social justice. The principle of mutual recognition would then trigger 
the paradoxical, and yet hopeful result of stopping to treat an Irish active person in 
Italy as an Italian worker and eventually treat an Italian active person like an Irish 
worker (if he/she wishes so). Such a system would in the end reduce (perhaps 
eliminate) the European classical unemployment, particularly strong in highly rigid 
countries like Italy.  
What is important is that beyond the minimum threshold there would exist in the 
European labour markets and Welfare States a mutual recognition system which 
would no longer be labelled as “social dumping” or unfair competition just because it 
is not welcome by some powerful insiders who are de facto rent-seekers. All these 
people advocating rigidities – irrespective of their intentions to protect the weak 
brackets of the labour force, but certainly protecting the strong brackets of it, namely 
themselves – would oppose the adoption of mutual recognition because this would 
increase competition in the labour market, just as it happens in the commodity 
market, with the effects which any competition rise entails, i.e. enhancing the 
wellbeing for the society as a whole, particularly for the unemployed and first job-
seekers, but certainly worsening it for those who already have a job highly protected 
and well paid.  
Should the principle of mutual recognition be adopted - at least as a worker’s right, 
not as a duty - one would observe that in the same firm of a given European country 
heterogeneous wage and Welfare conditions would be applied to similar workers. 
This should not raise fears, because it would bring about the exercise of a right and 
the benefit of being no longer unemployed, at least if the labour force were ready to 
accept wage and regulatory flexibility.  
Orthodox thinkers would pretend that all that is unfair, because the living cost is 
different in different countries, so that in each of them wages should be proportional 
to prices and social security contributions to benefits. However, if competition fully 
pervaded the European labour markets and Welfare States – as it is not the case 
nowadays, but as it would happen as a consequence of mutual recognition – there 
would be a fall in rigid countries’ prices and labour costs, probably a rise in flexible 
countries’ prices and wages, so that this problem would trend to gradually disappear. 
In any case, in order to reduce the inevitable opposition of the conventional wisdom 
and specially of insiders of the most rigid countries, one could envisage that mutual 
recognition might be initially introduced in the European labour markets and Welfare 
States only of a limited number of countries (in strengthened co-operation) and only 
for some categories of workers and sectors. Indeed, the latter process is already under 
way for self-employed workers with skills certified by law (doctors or lawyers) and 
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for some components of health care and pensions. That formula might initially be 
extended to employees with qualifications comparable to those of the recalled self-
employed (for example to University professors and the like), according to a method 
of variable geometry. 
To conclude, the socio-economic differences one may observe between various 
European labour markets and Welfare States depend on disparities which are not only 
unavoidable, but which have to be exploited in order to create those opportunities for 
exchange and competition which are necessary to reduce production costs, raise 
efficiency, eliminate artificial obstacles to the free movement of workers, increase 
employment hence equity, improve quality of life and wellbeing particularly for 
consumers and for the weakest components of the labour force. In the long run, the 
final result would be an a posteriori harmonisation of the European labour markets 
and Welfare States reached in a bottom-up process, not in a top-down one as it is 
usually the case with harmonisation. Were the principle of mutual recognition applied 
"to all sectors", as proposed by the European Commission Communication (1999b), 
each European citizen might use both the ius loci and the ius sanguinis, without being 
always compelled to opt for the former one.  
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APPENDIX* 
 
“Thou shalt neither vex a stranger, 
nor oppress him: for ye were 
strangers in the land of Egypt”   
Exodus 22, 21 
 
“The man who finds his country 
sweet is only a raw beginner; the 
man for whom each country is as 
his own is already strong; but only 
the man for whom the whole world 
is as a foreign country is perfect” 
(myself, a Bulgarian living in 
France, borrow this quotation from 
Edward Said, a Palestinian living 
in the United States, who himself 
found it in Erich Auerbach, a 
German exiled in Turkey)”  
T. Todorov (1992), The Conquest 
of America 
(And in turn myself, the daughter 
of a Greek-speaking mother, a 
German-speaking father and four 
grandparents of different 
nationalities, none of which Italian, 
borrow the quotation)  
 
The three forms - ghettoisation, assimilation (either closed or open) and mutual 
recognition discussed in Section 2 - have emerged in the course of time and have also 
been present in the twentieth century. 
Indeed, there not only exist oscillations in history or returns to the past, but, as it 
hopefully will become clear in what follows, there is also a continuum for example 
between philosophies advocating assimilation, those favourable to tolerance and the 
principle of mutual recognition. Perhaps only the extremes - represented by mutual 
recognition and ghettoisation - are truly disconnected.  
However, in Western societies, the passage from the first to the second and to the 
third form of the combination of unity with diversity seems to correspond to the 
transition from a more archaic conception to a more modern form of acceptance of 
diversity according to the neo-positivist idea (or utopia) of the "magnificent destinies 
                                               
* This text is the English translation of an updated version of a paper published in Italian partly in Lettera Internazionale (FKPS, 2001b) 
and partly in Il Mulino (FKPS, 2001c). It is forthcoming in French in Transcultura (FKPS, 2002b) and in Chinese in Tractatus (FKPS, 
2002c). I am grateful to Eloi Laurent, Sascia Lubicz, Nicola Salerno, Grazia Sgarra and particularly to Paolo Reboani for the 
collaboration given in the writing of Chapter 2 of FKPS (2001d), which includes an old version of this text and of the present paper’s 
Sections 2 and 3.   
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and progressions". The thesis is correct but is spoiled by simplistic optimism if it 
takes the view that movements are irreversible. The Roman Empire was certainly 
able to assimilate a North African and make him an Emperor, but it could not but 
ghettoise (before Constantin's Edict of Toleration) the Christians because, as the 
Jews, they questioned the basic power of the Emperor.  
If it is true that the Old Testament recognises such a value to diversity as to induce 
God to destroy the Tower of Babel because, having one single language, that society 
risked believing itself omnipotent ("Come, let Us go down and there confuse their 
language, so that they will not understand one another's speech ", Genesis 11, 7), it is 
also true that the Catholic Church after Paul did not know, and did not want to know, 
how to cultivate that noble idea. Indeed, it rejected as elitist the Hebrew view that 
"one must convert no-one" and showed itself disposed to accept everybody by 
"generously offering" to each individual - without distinction of race, colour, culture, 
origin - the possibility of salvation through baptism. In substance, it was operating a 
form of closed assimilation, aimed at saving people irrespective of the implied 
destruction of previous identities (think of the end of the Aztecs, the Mayas, the 
Incas), according to an ethical whereby intentions are profoundly different from 
results (even "the road to hell is paved with good intentions").  
And if it is true that open assimilation, to some extent more respectful of the role 
of diversity, is fundamentally the daughter of the Renaissance (Marsilio Ficino, 1473, 
justifies the variety of religions by stating that "Divine Providence does not permit 
any part of the world at any time to be completely without religion, although it does 
allow rites to differ. Perhaps variety of this kind is intended as a beautiful ornament" 
and Pico della Mirandola, 1486, conceives the idea of a religious syncretism), it is 
also true that open assimilation also existed in the pre-Christian world, where "Grecia 
capta ferum victorem coepit". To a certain degree, it was practised in Cordova and 
Toledo in the fifteenth century before the arrival of the highly Catholic king and 
queen Ferdinando of Aragon and Isabella of Castilla (but perhaps even after 1492 
there emerged a sort of tolerance towards the moriscos and the marrani, not always 
denounced by the Spanish pure blood Arians). It was also practised outside Europe, 
for example in China, which traded with the Western world, adopting some of its 
rules and exporting some of its own.  
As for the logical continuity of the three forms of unity-diversity combination, it is 
enough to think of the thread  binding the Levinas-styled humanistic monotheism 
rooted in the Old Testament, with Pauline monotheism and indeed this last one with 
the position expressed by Plato and the neo-platonic movement of the fifteenth 
century. However, since c'est le ton qui fait la musique, one cannot but note a 
remarkable dissonance between Levinas and the triumphant sense of assimilation "to 
one" in neo-platonic Cardinal Nicholas of Cusa's coincidentia oppositorum. 
"With a non Jew who leads a moral life - says Levinas (1976) - a Jew can 
communicate as intimately and religiously as with a Jew. The rabbinical principle 
whereby the just of all nations participate in the world to come does not only express 
an eschatological point of view. It affirms the possibility of extreme intimacy beyond 
the dogma affirmed by one group or another…This is our universalism…We have the 
reputation to think of ourselves as a chosen people and this reputation does much 
hard to such universalism. The idea of being a chosen people should not be taken as a 
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form of pride. It does not represent the recognition of exceptional rights, but of 
exceptional duties…the Hebraic concept of the election of Israel is not anterior to the 
universalism of a homogenous society where the difference between Jews, Hellenics 
and Barbarians is abolished. It encompasses this abolition, but remains for a Jew at 
any moment an indispensable condition for that abolition, a condition which must be 
recreated in any moment". 
Conversely, Plato wrote in his Parmenide: "Again, the like is opposed to the 
unlike. And the other to the same…And to be the same with the others is the opposite 
of being other than the others And in that it was other it was shown to be like …Then 
the one will be both like and unlike the others; like in so far as it is other, and unlike 
in so far as it is the same". More than one thousand and eight hundred years later 
Cardinal Nicholas of Cusa in his Apologia doctae ignorantiae (Cusa, 1440) reiterates 
the concept of the "coincidence of opposites" when he affirms that "there cannot be 
one maximum of all maxima. Maximum is something that is not opposed by anything 
else, where maximum and minimum coincide. Thus, the infinite unity is the 
complication of all things (something embracing all things) and it is called unity 
because it unifies everything". The dissonance of Cardinal Nicholas of Cusa becomes 
in open contrast to Levinas, when in his The Healing Power of Faith (1453) recalls 
that the Jews who reject some Christian beliefs, being "scarcely numerous…will not 
be able to upset the whole world with arms". But approximately five hundred years 
later, thanks to John XXIII first and Paul VI later, the Church position seemed to 
have completely changed (through it is still unclear whether that change is 
irreversible or not). Indeed, the Declaration on  the Relation of the Church to non-
Christian Religions, Nostra Aetate, proclaimed by His Holiness Pope Paul VI on 
October 28, 1965 says: "Since in the course of centuries not a few quarrels and 
hostilities have arisen between Christians and Moslems, this sacred Synod urges all to 
forget the past and to work sincerely for mutual understanding and to preserve as well 
as to promote together for  the benefit of all mankind social justice and moral 
welfare, as well as peace and freedom…Since the spiritual patrimony common to 
Christians and Jews is thus so great, this sacred Synod wants to foster and 
recommend that mutual understanding and respect which is the fruit, above all, of 
biblical and theological studies as well as of fraternal dialogues" (Paul VI, 1965). 
And how not to see the continuity-discontinuity dualism in the multi-culturalism 
implicit in the "separate but equal" doctrine (according to the Supreme Court's 
landmark Plessy v. Ferguson ruling of 1896 acknowledging to Blacks the right to 
accommodations identical to those for Whites though without the right to share them) 
and the apartheid emerging in the principle "equal but separate" (according to the 
1954 ruling Brown v. Board of Education of 1954), both originated by that dark and 
yet fascinating concept which is the American melting pot? 
 If we wish to quickly follow the path leading from culture to politics and to 
economics, it is worth noticing that the principle of the a priori coincidence of 
opposites, characterising the divine synthesis, is transformed and yet maintains its 
own nature in the shift from harmony-by-faith to harmony-by-law made by Graziano, 
XII-century monk from Bologna, author of the gigantic work Concordia 
discordantium canonum, which has been for centuries the Single Text of the Canonic 
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Law. Once again, the non-contradiction principle is used with the aim of assimilating 
(namely reducing, if not eliminating) differences. 
The elaboration of the political doctrine corresponding to the Great Inquisitor 
culture seems to reach its apex in Hegel's idealism, where the step from unity 
conquered through a dialectic process of thesis-antithesis-synthesis to the one 
obtained through the ethical State is more immediate. The nineteenth century creation 
and strengthening of National States is its historical-political expression. Indeed, also 
the aberrations of the twentieth century dictatorships, from the Nazi/Fascist one to 
that of proletariat, though being neither intrinsically not necessarily correlated to that 
philosophy, seem to be consistent with that principle (for instance, Hegel, 1821, finds 
"the ethical moment of war, which is not to be considered as the absolute evil…it has 
its highest meaning inasmuch it maintains the ethical health of peoples"). 
In economic terms - and that is an aspect worth noticing - those aberrations 
become assimilation-based policies or approaches favouring apartheid. More 
precisely, closed assimilation - aiming at including the different provided it stops 
being different and converts himself/herself, which is the only way to safety - has 
been characterising real socialism up to 1989. Stalin's URSS exports its own 
economic planning model by imposing it to Central-Eastern Europe with the aim of 
prompting the regeneration of the "Socialist man". Apartheid emerges in the Fascist 
autarchic regimes (similar to pre-market societies, to agricultural civilisations of self-
production and self-consumption): the other remains the other; no form of 
interchange is even attempted with it; there is no need for it (the regime is absolutely 
- or thinks to be - self-sufficient). 
More deeply, on the level of values, the principle of mutual recognition is based on 
the awareness of the benefits deriving from diversity and it is deeply rooted in a basic 
- though minoritarian - stand of the  European cultural tradition. It runs over a 2000-
year span, which is temporal, geographic, ideal and linguistic at the same time. It 
ranges from Horace's Epistolae  (around 20 B.C.) wondering quid velit et possit 
rerum concordia discors (what the discordant harmony of circumstances would and 
could do) to Nietzsche's Gay Science (1882), where he is grateful "to stand in the 
midst of this rerum concordia discors and of this whole marvellous uncertainty and 
rich ambiguity of existence".  
Humanism and liberalism both contribute to the idea of harmony a posteriori, 
meant as a way to meet the other and as a balance of powers. Major contributions 
come from Galilei's scientific spirit (1632, " for my part I consider the earth very 
noble and admirable precisely because of the diverse alterations, changes, 
generations, etc. that occur in it incessantly"), with the consequent modern 
evolutionism, and from Montesquieu's spirit of law (1748), with his idea of the 
separation and independence of the executive, legislative and judiciary powers. The 
ethics of results of protestant origin and the one inspired to Machiavelli's The Prince 
(1513, "he who neglects what is done for what ought to be done, sooner effects his 
ruin than his preservation"); Vico's heterogenesis of ends (1725, "this world without 
doubt has issued from a mind often diverse, at times quite contrary, and always 
superior to the particular ends that men had proposed to themselves"), but also Adam 
Smith's "invisible hand" (1776) and the whole English empirism. Levinas' Humanism 
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of the Other (1972) puts together the ancient and modern humanist heritage, from the 
Old Testament to the Italian Renaissance to French Enlightenment. 
Nobody seems better than Todorov (1992) - or Braudel in his Grammaire des 
civilisations (1993) - to describe this patrimony in his European historic path: 
"Western Europe has sought to assimilate what is alien, to force the disappearance of 
the exterior being and, for the most part, it has succeeded. Its way of life and its 
values have been spread around the world. As Columbus wanted, those who have 
been colonised have adopted out customs and clothes…I think that this period of 
European history is disappearing today.  
The representatives of Western society no longer believe so ingenuously in their 
own superiority and the assimilation movement is coming to an end…We are seeking 
to bring together what we feel are the best terms of the alternative, that is we want 
equality without it meaning identity, but we also want difference without it to become 
superiority/inferiority…we want to resume the sense of a society without loosing the 
sense of individual". The recognition of what is alien and diverse - Todorov recalls 
(1989) - is but the result of the awareness that "each human being is multi-fold and 
any attempt to unify him/her ends in mutilation". 
Thus, the principle of mutual recognition is, in some aspects, as old as the Tower 
of Babel, but, for other aspects, is a new discovery of the twentieth century and is an 
ongoing social and political conquest. This is because globalisation has brought about 
the daily contact with diversity and only now the idea of belonging to heterogeneous 
civilisations is labelled as a richness, which would be absurd to throw away, though 
we all are (and want to be) part and parcel of a single society. Mutual recognition is 
the privileged instrument transforming each individual into a citizen of the world, a 
n-component vector which cannot be found identical in any other human being. Like 
DNA, those components belong to one single individual who - despite all this - is 
also part of the surrounding society39. If one looks at ghettoisation or assimilation, 
each single member of a group must be (and preferably is) represented by an n-
component vector (almost) identical to the one characterising any other individual of 
that same group. Today the real challenge - for example, in our continent - is making 
European citizens of Italian language, of Serb-Orthodox religion, of French culture, 
living in England, residing in a country Dutch-styled manor, live in harmony. 
Only mutual recognition can do that, as it separates rights (duties) and 
geographical location: the law enforced in a Member State is enforceable in another 
Member State thanks to the circulation of goods, services, capitals, or even mobile 
workers (if our proposals are accepted). Should mutual recognition enter the labour 
market or the social protection schemes, whenever an individual moves within 
Europe, he/she bears with him/her also a social capital consisting of  the whole 
economic-judicial aspects of his/her home State. Rights would no longer be 
constringent on geography, as each worker would bear them with him/her when 
he/she moves within Europe, thus embodying the motto "omnia mea mecum porto".  
The intention of mutual recognition in Europe is therefore clear, but it remains 
unclear how we will get there, how to permanently reconcile individual diversities 
                                               
39 The exhibition "Tous parents tous différents" organised at the Musée de l'Homme in Paris illustrates the idea that race distinctions are 
pointless, and not because races do no exist, but because there are too many races, as they are not five, but more than 5 billions, 
that is as many as our DNAs.  
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with a cohesive society, how to identify that minimum common framework 
possessing the various n-component vectors to arrive at a point where each can live 
with the other in civility and harmony. Perhaps the solution is a wise, pragmatic 
mixture  of logic and experimentation, of deduction and induction, of small steps 
subject to trials and errors. 
To find a theoretical, and yet operative, response to those questions means to go 
towards the future in a vision that, if not historical-theological, is at least 
evolutionary-innovating. The European society is asking for this response ever more 
pressingly, as recently indicated by the Eurobarometer survey (SORA, 2001), where 
“the number of those considering immigrants as people able to enrich the life of one's 
own country has grown from 33% in 1997 to 48% in 2000". But even more Europe 
needs that - in spite of what we have just stated – because only 39% of the population 
is ready "to accept immigrants coming from other Member States in one's own 
country of residence without restrictions". We therefore have the duty to learn and 
teach”. 
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